• tal@lemmy.today
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    7 months ago

    Man, there is a lot of concerning stuff there.

    In particular, one person commented that the original xz maintainer was possibly subjected to a pressure campaign to hand over maintainership.

    Another interesting data point: about 2 years ago there was a clear pressure campaign to name a new maintainer:

    https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00566.html

    At the time I thought it was just rude, but maybe this is when it all started.

    I don’t know how many open-source project maintainers would be on guard for something that subtle, people coordinating to take over maintainership of a project.

    I mean, xz isn’t normally something you’d immediately think of as security-critical. I doubt that a maintainer knows or thinks about about all the potential downstream dependencies (in this case, not even a standard sshd depedendency, but one that came up because of a patch that Debian used to add some systemd functionality).

    EDIT:

    I mean, xz isn’t normally something you’d immediately think of as security-critical.

    On second thought, it actually is, given that Debian packages are xz-compressed.

    • Moonrise2473@feddit.it
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      7 months ago

      Wow

      And for a state sponsored attacker is cheaper to bribe (or threaten to kill, even cheaper) the single developer to add a backdoor than all the research to find a zero day